ColeA@Cardiff.ac.uk Our first hypothesis is that decentralisation in France is part of a broader programme of state reform, part of a drive by central governors to divest themselves of unwanted or inflationary functions. It is an exercise in
steering at a distance. The metaphor of steering is drawn from the governance literature (Marin and Mayntz, 1991; Mayntz, 1993; Rhodes, 1997; Pierre, 2000 , Gaudin, 2002 , in particular its German version. For Mayntz (1993: 11 ) the metaphor of 'steering' refers to 'the ability of political authorities to mould their social environments'. In recent decades governments in all European countries have been confronted with a weakening capacity to steer society by proposing solutions to the problems they have identified. Modern states need to lower expectations of public policy action and develop new policy instruments to manage complexity (Le Galès and Lascoumbes, 2004) . The history of French decentralisation can be interpreted as part of a broader effort by the French state to deal with the increasing complexity of its charge and to reform itself (Caillose, 2004; Crozier, 1992) . The state can no longer assume alone the management of complexity, if ever it could. 'Steering at a distance' refers to one strategy to cope with increased complexity: namely, that of delegating difficult decisions to lower echelons of public administration.
For some supporters of decentralisation, the state is an ineffective local policy-maker because it ignores local knowledge and circumstances. Our second hypothesis is that of decentralisation can be explained in terms of new forms of local and regional capacity building. Decentralisation is best understood in terms of liberating the entrepreneurial energies and political capacity of local and regional players. We define capacity in terms of viable institutions, embedded inter-institutional relationships, political leadership and policy entrepreneurship, asymmetry in policy delivery and the development of local and regional public arenas. Thus defined, capacity is broadly derived from the local political leadership and urban governance literature (Stone, 1989 , Hirst, 1994 , John, 2001 , Le Galès, 2002 . Though decentralisation is justified in terms of enhancing local and regional capacity, it is not in this hypothesis explicitly linked with identity politics.
Our third hypothesis is that decentralisation in France is shaped by new forms of identity-based territorial mobilisation. Minority nationalism and political regionalism have emerged as powerful forces across Western Europe (McEwen and Moreno, 2005) . There has been a revival of ethnoterritorial identities and a challenge to the centralist model of the unitary state (Keating, Loughlin and Deschouer, 2003 Keating and McGarry, 2001; de Winter and Türsan, 1998, Keating, 1998) . As local and regional communities are imagined in distinctive ways in different places, so the pattern in Europe is for an 'asymmetrical configuration of government and a multiplicity of institutional regimes ' (Majone, 2003) . Strong identity can be translated in political terms by the development of ethno-territorial parties; in cultural terms by the dissemination of identity markers such as language, in institutional terms by the construction of alternative polity building visions or, in its weakest form, by methods of elite accommodation.
Thus designed, the article sets out to evaluate the relative importance of state reform, capacity building and territorial identities as explanatory variables for understanding decentralisation in France. Conceptualisation is essential in order to research the complex research object of French decentralisation. Our dependent variable ('decentralisation') is itself a compound entity that encompasses actor motivations, institutional and policy outputs and political and partisan processes. The framework we propose allows explanations to be contextualised according to whether we place most importance on the motivations imputed to actors (hypothesis one), explanations of institutional and policy outputs (hypothesis two) or political and partisan processes (hypothesis three). The main body of the article now addresses the arguments for interpreting decentralisation in terms of these three alternative approaches. It begins with an introduction to the context of French centralisation and decentralisation.
Centralisation and Decentralisation in France
France is traditionally presented as the paradigm of the unitary state. The French revolution of 1789 (and its Napoleonic aftermath) swept away provincial autonomy and created a sophisticated administrative infrastructure throughout the French territory (Dupuy and Thoenig, 1985) .
The deep penetration of the state into civil society remains highly visible in France today (Page, 1991 , Sharpe, 1993 . The traditional French system of 'territorial administration' rested upon the principle of administrative uniformity across the nation (Sadran 1992) . It recognised the superiority of central state interests over those of parties, interest groups and localities. It formed part of a hierarchical mode of top-down organisation, whereby public policies originated within government departments or administrative corps; were implemented in localities by state field agencies and local authorities, and were co-ordinated by the prefect, the representative of the French State in the departments.
In practice, centre-periphery relations were much more flexible than this model implied, as uncovered in the empirical studies undertaken by researchers in the Centre for the Sociology of Organisations (CSO) in the 1960s and 1970s (Worms, 1966; Crozier and Thoenig, 1975; Grémion, 1976) . Particularly influential, the 'cross-regulation' approach developed by Crozier and Thoenig (1975) described relations between local political and administrative actors in this state-centric and bureaucratic system. Three pillars supported the system. First, national politicians and officials defined the rules governing centre-periphery relations. Second, there was a longterm dialogue between state officials (notably the prefect) and leading notables to allow for adjustments to nationally defined rules to reflect local circumstances. Third, local relationships were limited to a 'dual elite' of political and administrative actors; there was no place for 'third parties, whether they be economic interests or voluntary associations ' (Duran and Thoenig, 1996, p. 588) . The principal local relationships in this pattern of cross-regulation were between political notables (parliamentarians, mayors, departmental councillors) and state officials (either prefects, or officials from the ministerial field services). There was an incentive for ambitious politicians to accumulate elective offices (cumul des mandats) as office gave access to higher levels of authority and consolidated local power bases.
The model of cross-regulation applied mainly to rural and small town France. Large cities, undertaking cohesive public policies from the early twentieth century in some instances, fell outside of the cross-regulation model. From the 1960s onwards, the model of cross-regulation became less influential in rural areas and small towns as well. During the 1970s, the localist case began to be won at the level of ideas (Ohnet, 1996; Boeuf, 2004) The watershed in the governance of French municipalities occurred in 1977, when the left captured control of almost three-quarters of large towns.
Left-run municipalities were not content to engage in traditional lobbying practices. Many of the new municipal teams were strongly influenced by the ideas of the May '68 movement, notably those of self-management and social experimentation. A belief in proximity, democratic empowerment, citizenship and local self-reliance were thus important facets of a changing ideological and policy climate that preceded the institutional reforms of the early 1980s.
The French Socialist government's reforms of 1982-3 were ambitious (Boguenard, 2004; Gaudemet and Gohin, 2004; Levy, 2001; Schmidt, 1990) . The reforms both created new institutions (the 22 elected regional councils), and greatly enhanced the decision-making powers of existing players (the 96 departmental councils and the larger communes). The decentralisation reforms recognised local authorities as fully operational legal entities freed from a priori prefectoral control. The decision-making responsibilities of local and regional actors were increased, with the extension of sub-national influence into new policy areas such as social affairs, economic development and education. In most respects, the 'departmentalists' defeated the 'regionalists' in 1982-83, as they would again in 2003-4. The departments were given larger budgets, more staff and more service-delivery responsibilities than the regions. Central government preferred to deal with the relatively subservient departments, rather than strong regions which might contest its authority.
The 1982 reforms were guided by two rather contradictory principles: that types of decision should be attributed to specific 'levels' of public administration (communal, departmental, regional) ; but that all authorities should be free to develop policies in areas they deemed to be important for their constituents (Fonrojet, 2004) . The first of these principles enshrined the so-called 'blocs de compétences', signifying particular responsibilities carried out by the different levels. As a general rule, matters of immediate proximity (low-level social assistance, administrative port of first call, planning permission, waste) are the preserve of the communes and the various inter-communal bodies -SIVU (Gaudin, 1999; Pasquier, 2004; Pontier, 1998) . Under the terms of the 1982 law, the regional council first draws up a State-Region plans can not, however, be reduced to crude central steering.
Through its use of contracts, the French state has begun to operate in a more flexible manner in an attempt to mobilise resources beyond its control (Richter, 2004 , Gaudin, 1999 , 2002 . Contractual procedures are inherently unstable and they can produce outcomes that are variable across the national territory 11 . They involve negotiation between partners with the status of formal equals and the departmental and regional councils can refuse to agree to the State's demands. The constitution now affirms that the principle of 'free administration' requires local and regional authorities to be responsible for raising the 'overwhelming proportion' of their revenues in local taxation. The provision implies that local and regional authorities would be given far greater tax-raising powers, able to vary, within limits, local taxation. This provision raised much opposition on behalf of local and regional politicians.
The tax-raising power, welcome in principle, would force local politicians to raise taxes in order to run unpopular services. The main fear was that financial transfers from central government would be reduced accordingly (Sueur, 2005) .
Decentralisation as 'steering at a distance' has a powerful resonance. The delegation of new service delivery responsibilities forms part of a broader process of state reform, the perennial preoccupation of policy-makers in
France. In the debate on local finances, there were echoes of British-style new public management, insofar as government ministers welcome the prospect that local financial accountability would be enhanced. Steering at a distance was not in the least a federal conception. Services would be delivered at a regional, departmental or local level in ways that were closely regulated and defined by the central state.
Decentralisation as local and regional capacity building?
Our second hypothesis we label as local and regional capacity building.
Political scientists understand capacity in a variety of ways (Gambetta, 1988; Stone, 1989; John, 2001; Pasquier, 2004 More cohesive local government structures have developed in recent years.
They are rooted in urban governance and processes of metropolitanisation (Ascher, 1998; Le Galès, 2002 Interconnectivity provides a variation on the theme of meso-level capacity.
Local and regional authorities need to develop efficient horizontal and vertical relationships -or at least to avoid damaging zero-sum disputes -if there are to carry out their minimal duties. Good relationships are required to make the institutions of French sub-national governance function effectively. Relationships between levels of meso-level governance (local, departmental, regional) are not necessarily played out as a zero-sum game.
The ability of a regional council, for example, to articulate an overarching territorial vision might be enhanced by strengthening inter-communal collaboration. Inter-communal structures, usually based on employment or training zones that are substantially larger than traditional communal boundaries, are generally consistent with the region's own planning on a sub-regional level.
The state of inter-institutional linkages varies in accordance with local and regional circumstances. Empirical investigation we carried out in two leadership, but also of the ability of local leaders to shape their environments (Lagroye, 1973; Biarez, 1989; Phlipponeau, 1977; Borraz, 1998) . The local government route can produce political leaders of international reputations, such as Bertrand Delanöe in Paris. The mayoral office, rather than the presidency of a departmental or a regional council, continues to be the most coveted amongst politicians with a base in local government. Decentralisation enhanced the power of urban mayors by loosening tight state controls on their financial capacity and by increasing their legal and political scope for innovation (Faure, 1991 , Lorrain, 1991 , Lorrain 1993 , Borraz, 1998 (Gaudin, 1995; Gaudin, 1999; Le Galès 1995; Cole and John, 1995) . Local power has become more complex, and the successful mayors are those powerful enough to pull the shifting framework together. Not only can local and regional authorities bid to run new functions, they can also derogate themselves from providing services on a case by case basis. These two articles (37/1 and 72) create the potential for expanding asymmetry between local authorities and within the French State.
The European dimension provides some further evidence of capacity building. Here is not the place to revisit the theory of multi-level governance that, whatever its merits, arguably places excessive importance on the linkages between the third (subnational) and first (supranational) levels We can summarise the development of capacity in terms of the growth of local and regional public spheres (François and Neveu, 1999; Cole and John, 1995; Cole, 1997) . By local and regional public spheres are signified arenas within which a plurality of organisations interacts: local and regional authorities, regional prefectures, the field services of central ministries, firms, associations and to lesser extent social partners. These arenas can contribute to developing local and regional capacity to the extent they can mobilise coherent territorial policy networks. The examples of Brittany and the Nord/Pas-de-Calais presented above illustrate that there is no iron law equating decentralised political institutions and the mobilisation of territorialized policy communities. But decentralisation has provided new institutional channels through which political, economic, associative and administrative actors can interact.
Decentralisation and identity construction
Our third hypothesis is that decentralisation in France is shaped by new forms of identity-based territorial mobilisation. The heart of the minority nationalist/new regionalist argument is that almost everywhere there has been a revival of ethno-territorial identities and a challenge to the centralist model of the unitary state (de Winter, 1998 , Keating, 1998 , Loughlin, 2001 , Moreno, 2005 (Balme, 1999 , Nay, 1997 , Pasquier, 2004 , Zeller and Stussi, 2004 . They were created in a standardised form throughout France, including in areas where no regional tradition existed.
With the partial exception of Brittany and Corsica, France's historic regions and communities do not enjoy institutional expression. The Basque movement has so far failed in its minimal demand for a Basque department.
There is a small electoral clientele for regionalism in Alsace, Savoy, identities feed into institution-building anywhere on the French mainland, they are likely to do so in Brittany, which we identify from the existing literature as the region in mainland France with the most distinctive sense of its own identity (Ford, 1993 , Le Coadic, 1998 , MacDonald, 1989 , Nicolas, 1986 , Pasquier, 2004 . In theory, Brittany possesses key features identified by Moreno to develop an 'ethno-territorial' identity: a pre-state political existence 22 , an autonomist Breton political movement; a language rights movement, strong cultural traditions and specific forms of elite accommodation. Brittany is also one of the few regions where political institutions refer to a distinctive political region. 23 There is a complex pattern of multiple Breton identities and a willingness to envisage more advanced forms of political decentralisation than elsewhere in France (Le Coadic, 1998 , Pillet, 2001 . Brittany therefore provides a robust case for testing the importance and limitations of the relationship between territorial identities and political institutions; and for pinning down the sources of support for regional political institutions.
To investigate further a polling organisation was commissioned to carry out a survey in June 2001 24 . Findings will now be presented relating to compound identities and institutional preferences and a number of deductions will be made about regional/ethno-territorial politics and the political opportunity structure. We measured identity by using the Moreno scale, which asked respondents to situate themselves along a five-point continuum ('Breton, not French, 'more Breton than French, 'As Breton as Table 2 .
--- Table 2 around here ---Brittany has the optimum identity spread: a powerful sense of territorial identity, which is easily accommodated within the framework of the existing French state. There is little perceived conflict between being Breton and being French: the median position ('As Breton as French') being the overwhelming favourite. On the other hand, our findings explode the myth that there is only one French identity: three-quarters of the survey declared themselves to feel at least as Breton as French. These findings back up the common perception that Brittany is a 'strong identity' region. Though the sense of regional identity is strong, however, this is not considered as being in opposition to an overarching French nationhood.
Brittany is also the birthplace of the idea of regional political institutions in
France (Pasquier, 2004) . The survey captured institutional preferences for the future in Brittany that are presented in Table 3 . It reveals a strong demand in Brittany for consolidating or strengthening existing regional institutions, with a firm foundation of support for more enhanced forms of regional governance. Cross-tabulations demonstrate a convergence towards the median identity position -'As Breton as French' -and support for either retaining the existing regional institutions, or moving towards a more powerful regional body with legislative and tax varying powers 25 .
--- Table 3 around here ---What variables came into play when supporting these varying degrees of political autonomy? To obtain answers, we undertook logistic regression, with a view to elucidating differing attitudes to the hypothetical situations of political independence, full legislative devolution, limited devolution and opposition to any form of regional political institution. 26 A number of independent variables were identified, such as age, gender, education and place of birth. The attitudinal and opinion variables of identity, aptitude in the Breton languages, preferred level of decision for policies and intended voting behaviour in a regional and general election were also included. Table 4 provides the logistic regression estimates for Brittany.
- Table 4 
Discussion and conclusions
The article set out to evaluate the relative importance of state reform, local and regional capacity building and territorial identities as explanatory variables for understanding decentralisation in France. The first conclusion is that decentralisation in France needs to be read at different levels: in Even in a strong identity region such as Brittany, regional advocacy has been promoted through the existing French political parties, rather than by nationalist or regionalist alternatives (Cole and Loughlin, 2003) . (Le Galès, 2002 , Loughlin, 2001 , John, 2001 , Pierre, 2000 , Gaudin, 1999 , 2002 . We do not embrace the multi-level governance approach per se, but the article has presented some evidence that local and regional players are focussing upon new institutional arenas and building novel trans-national relationships to by-pass tight state controls. In most respects, however, the EU system of governance is based around supranational institutions and member-states, not the territorial substrata thereof.
In defence of the second hypothesis, decentralisation must be read as a process, not a single event. Local and regional capacity building has both an iterative and a cognitive dimension. Local and regional authorities have become entrepreneurial as they have gained experience and confidence. namely, attitudes to political institutions, to language, to education and training issues, as well as sociodemographic characteristics. For the purposes of establishing relationships, we recoded our data to develop multivariate models of institutional preference. We ran logistic regression to explain individual support for each of the possible institutional situations. In Brittany, we extrapolated four different dependent variables from our institutional scale. We coded these as : 1. ' independent Brittany', 0 'others' ("independence" column in table); 1 'Regional Council with law making and taxation powers', 0 'others' ("Regional Council with extended competencies" column); 1 'Regional Council with limited law-making and taxation powers', 0 'others' ("Regional Council with limited competencies" column);
'no regional Council', 0 'others' ("No Regional Council" column). We selected the independent variables of age (3 '16-24 years', 2 '25-44 years', 1 '45 years and more'), gender (0 'male', 1 'female'), education (1 'lowest or no degree' to 6 'upper degree'), place of birth (0 'other', 1
